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Este artículo explora los efectos de un conjunto de variables fiscales sobre 
el crecimiento regional en España a lo largo del periodo 1965-1997. Se 
utilizan para ello estimaciones de datos de panel. Los resultados muestran 
que el consumo público afecta negativamente al crecimiento, la inversión 
pública ejerce un efecto positivo (aunque no significativo estadísticamente) 
sobre la tasa de crecimiento y el déficit público reduce la inversión privada 
y, con ello, el crecimiento. Por su parte, los impuestos y las prestaciones 
sociales no parecen beneficiar al crecimiento económico regional. Los 
resultados son robustos a cambios en la especificación. 
 





This paper studies the effects of several fiscal variables on regional 
economic growth in Spain over period 1965-1997. Panel estimates are 
reported for this sample. The results show that public consumption affects 
negatively growth, public investment exerts a positive (but non always 
significant) effect on growth rate and public deficit seems to affect private 
investment and hence economic growth. Also it is found that taxes and 
social benefits are growth-impeding. Alternative estimates to deal with 
specification problems are considered, and the results are confirmed. 
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The eﬀect of ﬁscal policies on regional growth is still a relevant issue. Firstly,
the persistence of regional disparities in the European countries makes us
doubt about the eﬀectiveness of the regional policies implemented through
structural funds (Boldrin and Canova, 2001). Secondly, the future enlarge-
ment of the European Union will generate a new scenario for these policies,
which will entail fewer resources for countries of the EU-15; hence, national
and regional governments will be forced to a more eﬃcient and eﬀective use
of the public policies for regional development.
Several issues are now involved in the debate of the relations between ﬁs-
cal policy and growth. A ﬁrst subject comes from the discussion on whether
governments are able to modify the steady-state growth path or not, that
is, if an endogenous growth model is followed instead of the neoclassical
approach. Although the most of the empirical papers on growth use a
theoretical framework based on Solow-type models, recent papers suggest
that future research should focus on models that exhibit endogenous growth
(Bernanke and Gurkaynak, 2001).
Another central point is the generally accepted view that a large pub-
lic sector is growth-impeding. This claim can be found in papers such as
Barro, 1991, Hanson and Henrekson, 1994 or De la Fuente, 1997. However,
empirical evidence against this result is pointed out in works by Easterly
and Rebelo, 1993 and Mendoza et al., 1997. Hence, literature does not
provide an unambiguous conclusion and a diversity of results is to be ex-
pected according to samples and econometric speciﬁcation used (Agell et
al., 1997).
If the composition of public spending and taxes is considered, a richer
approach about the eﬀects of public sector on growth can be reached (Tanzi
1and Zee, 1997). Certain activities of government may aﬀect growth rates
positively; public investment in productive infrastructures is the best ex-
ample of this, although such inﬂuence should be qualiﬁed for taking the
elasticity of output respect public investment into account (Barro, 1990).
On the other hand, from a theoretical approach, the eﬀect of public con-
sumption on growth could present any sign; mainly, it will depend on the
substitution between private and public consumption. Usually, a negative
coeﬃcient for public consumption is found in growth regressions (Easterly
and Rebelo, 1993 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In turn, social bene-
ﬁts may have diﬀerent eﬀects on growth. If they are viewed as a mechanism
to maintain property rights or to retire low-productivity worker from labour
force, the eﬀect of this public spending is to be expected growth-enhancing
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996); conversely, when transfer payments from government
to households reduce the incentives to save and/or work, a negative inﬂuence
will be found (Fölster and Herenkson, 1999).
Alternatively, one the most robust results of the literature shows that
distorting taxes exert a negative impact on growth rates. As is well-known,
these taxes alter the private decisions on savings and capital accumulation
and hence the growth rate. Theoretical models such as Jones et al., 1993
or Cassou and Lansing, 1997 and empirical papers by Kneller et al., 1999
and Bleaney et al., 2001 support this conclusion.
Another key ﬁscal variable is the public surplus. Although their eﬀects on
growth are complex, a positive inﬂuence on growth may be predicted. This
is caused by the negative consequences of the public debt on capital markets
and hence on private investment (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Domenech et
al., 2000).
Recently, studies on economic growth and ﬁscal policy have stressed the
2importance of taking into account both sides of public performance -taxes
and public spending- jointly (Kneller et al., 1999; Bleaney et al., 2001).
They claim that the set of ﬁscal variables must be considered simultaneously
in this kind of studies; otherwise, biased estimates of growth regressions are
obtained and policy implications may be misleading.
This paper aims to yield insights into the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on growth
for the case of the Spanish regions over period 1965-1997. Hence we translate
the empirical growth literature on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy to a regional level,
focusing on the composition of public budget. Moreover, we wonder whether
to consider both sides of public activity is relevant for our analysis.
At this point, we believe this paper is the ﬁrst one in providing a discus-
sion of both issues. Most references interested in evaluating the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy on the Spanish regional growth focus on public spending vari-
ables, specially public investment. De la Fuente and Vives, 1995 and Mas et
al., 1996 ﬁnd that infrastructures have aﬀected regional growth positively.
Conversely, the results obtained by Gorostiaga, 1999 and González-Páramo
and Martínez, 2003 are ambiguous about this positive eﬀect. Regarding pub-
lic transfers, Bajo et al., 1999 detect a negative eﬀect of these on growth
in the Spanish regions as a whole, while this eﬀect becomes positive in the
poorest regions.
We have run a number of standard growth regressions with ﬁscal vari-
ables among regressors. The results show that public consumption, taxes
and social beneﬁts aﬀect growth rate negatively, whereas budget surplus
and public investment exert a positive eﬀect. The eﬀect of public surplus
seems to ﬂow through private investment. Alternatives estimates to deal
with problems of endogeneity support these conclusions. The ﬁndings we
obtain have clear policy implications about the relevance of diﬀerent public
3instruments to enhance economic growth at a regional level, and highlight
that redistribution policies have a cost in terms of growth rate.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the data
s o u r c e sw eh a v eu s e da n dc h a r a c t e r i s t ics of the variables involved in our
regressions. Section 3 displays the estimates of a growth equation where
several ﬁscal variables are included. Next section provides alternative esti-
mates where we consider the likely endogeneity of various regressors. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 Data sources and characteristics
Unlike growth studies for developed national economies, where the availabil-
ity of data sets makes easier the empirical implementation, even allowing
sensitivity analysis for various deﬁnitions of the variables, things are dif-
ferent at a regional level. Many of the variables we would like to use, for
instance technological diﬀusion or a more suitable measurement of human
capital, do not exist at a regional level. Something similar happens when ﬁs-
cal variables are considered. Anyway we have been able to get a long enough
sample that allow us to reach consistent results for several speciﬁcations of
the growth regression. Our sample consist of 17 Spanish regions over the
period 1965-1997. Particularly, we have used the following non-ﬁscal vari-
ables:
1. Income per capita (yit): Regional GDP per active worker, with bian-
nual observations. The choice of active population for measuring re-
gional output per capita is intentional. After having used values cor-
responding to employed population and working-age population, we
have checked that the best behaviour of the regressions takes places
4with the active population. This circumstance is specially clear if our
purpose is to control the regional business cycle through unemploy-
ment rate (uit); some papers point out that the regional diﬀerentials
in unemployment rates are relevant in the Spanish regional growth
process (Bentolila and Jimeno, 1995). Hence unemployment rate has
been included as regressor1.
2. Private investment (spit): Ratio of regional private investment in phys-
ical capital over the regional GDP.
3. Population growth (nit): Since our per capita variables are measured
in terms of active worker, this variable refers to the growth rate of
regional active population.
The set of ﬁscal variables consists of:
1. Productive public investment (sgit): Percentage of productive public
investment (roads, hydraulic infrastructures, urban structures, ports)
done in a territory over the regional GDP. For this category, we con-
sider productive capital spending by central, regional and local gov-
ernments as a whole.
2. Taxes (τit): Share of tax resources collected by the government in a
region over the regional GDP. This concept consists of social security
contributions, direct and indirect taxes.
3. Public consumption (cgit): There are no data available for this vari-
able over the period 1965-1997. Then we have had to use two proxy
variables. The ﬁrst one is the regional labour cost in the public sector
over regional GDP. The second one is the share of production of public
services in a region over the value of total regional production.
54. Budget surplus/deﬁcit (dt): Percentage of the public surplus/deﬁcit
over the national GDP. Obviously, this is a level-national variable thus
its value is common to all regions and refers to all levels of government.
A positive value denotes budget surplus and so on.
5. Social beneﬁts (psit): This variable includes unemployment beneﬁts,
retirement pensions and familiar beneﬁts received by regional house-
holds.
6. Redistributive function (sit): This variable is deﬁned as a ratio; nu-
merator consists of the eﬀects of public performance on households’ in-
come, i.e., households’ gross disposable income minus direct incomes
generated by households and other transfers received by households
from rest of the world; denominator is the regional GDP. This ratio
aims to measure to what extent of the regional GDP represents the
ﬂow of resources that is aﬀected by taxes and social spending programs
jointly. Lago, 2001 argues that this variable is a good proxy for the
redistributive function of the government at a regional level.
All the previous monetary variables are measured at 1986 prices. Budget
surplus/deﬁcit has been taken from the Spanish National Institute of Statis-
tics. The rest of the data can be found in Foundation BBVA (several years);
many of them are available in http://w3.grupobbva.com/TLFB/TLFBindex.htm).
Before introducing the results of estimates, we have checked that data
for public consumption and taxes do not display a biased geographical dis-
tribution in favour of the region of Madrid. Although the values of Madrid
are among the highest, they are below those corresponding to other regions
for years.
63 Estimates of the growth regression with ﬁscal
variables
One of the main controversies in economic growth lies on whether the growth
rate of income per capita may be aﬀected by government or not in the long-
term. The answer is clearly "no" if we use a neoclassical growth model.
Conversely, endogenous growth theories claim that the long-run growth rate
of income per capita may depend on variables such as public spending or
taxes. In this paper we are interested in testing what kind of eﬀects, if they
are, ﬁscal policy has exerted on growth rate. But previously we need to
know whether to consider simultaneously both sides of public performance
is a relevant question in our sample. This aim is based on the recent contri-
butions by Kneller et al, 1999 and Bleaney et al., 2001 but we are aware
that replicating strictu sensu their framework is not possible at a regional
level.
The expression we are going to estimate is the following:






γjXjt + uit, (1)
where git i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fe c o n o m yi at time t, αi is a constant that




a group of conditioning (non-ﬁscal) variables and
m P
j=1
γjXjt is a set of ﬁscal
variables. Regardless technical details, the estimates of a very simple growth
regression for a panel of Spanish regions are shown in table 1. Only two
non-ﬁscal conditioning variables have been considered, namely: population
growth and rate of private investment2.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
7The evidence that both sides of public budget constraint should be taken
into consideration is clear. When public investment is the only ﬁscal vari-
able included in regression (column (2)), a negative coeﬃcient is obtained
for this regressor. This result might indicate that the eﬀects of other ﬁscal
variables omitted in estimation (for instance, taxes) bias the coeﬃcient of a
variable expected to be beneﬁcial for growth. As taxes are included among
the regressors, the coeﬃcient of public investment turns into a positive sign.
Also, it is noticed that the negative coeﬃcient of taxes is bigger (in absolute
terms) when the eﬀect of public investment is considered explicitly (column
(3)) than when this is ignored (column (1)); thus the eﬀect of public invest-
ment may partially oﬀset the reducing-growth eﬀect of taxes when this type
of public spending does not appear in the regressions.
Next, a further econometric analysis is implemented in order to reach
more detailed results about the relations between ﬁscal policy and growth
rate at a regional level. We have followed a panel data approach. As pointed
out by Islam, 1995, this methodology allows us to yield unbiased estimates
when unobserved heterogeneity may exist at a regional level. Moreover, to
employ panel regressions implies to elude several problems produced by a
cross-section analysis; for example, cross-section studies using long obser-
vation periods leads to an endogenous selection of tax policy (Fölster and
Henrekson, 2001), and cross sectional analyses may have a potentially se-
vere simultaneity problem between ﬁscal and non-ﬁscal variables owing to
the long period considered. All the estimation exercises have been carried
out weighting the observations in the cross-section so as to avoid the het-
eroskedasticity caused by the diﬀe r e n ts i z eo ft h eu n i t s .W eh a v ea l s ou s e da
White covariance matrix. A time trend is included to control for (exogenous)
technical progress 3.
8Table 2 shows the results corresponding to several speciﬁcations of the
growth regression. None of them includes a human capital indicator due to
the important problems of multicollinearity caused by this variable4.S i n c e
the Hausman tests provide evidence on the existence of correlations between
individual eﬀects and the regressors, the results presented here are obtained
by a ﬁxed eﬀects (within-groups) estimator. An F test is also included to
evaluate the joint signiﬁcance of the regional ﬁxed eﬀects; the null hypothesis
of non-signiﬁcance of these eﬀects is strongly rejected.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The results in the table 2 show that the values and signs of non-ﬁscal
variables are usually those to be expected. Moreover, their statistical sig-
niﬁcance is accepted. The negative sign of log of initial per capita income
reﬂects the catching-up eﬀect of poorest economies. Since our speciﬁcation
of this regressor is in terms of logarithms, we can compute an estimate of
the speed of convergence towards steady-state. This value is around 6-8 per
cent for all estimates and similar to those obtained in other studies when
using panel data (Islam, 1995). On the other hand, and unlike papers such
as Fölster and Henrekson, 1999 and Kneller et al., 1999, where a negative
and not signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is reached for private investment in most spec-
iﬁcations, reasonable coeﬃcients are achieved for this variable in our sample,
although their values are slightly low (specially in column (3)) . Although
the coeﬃcients of unemployment rate are not reported here, this variable
performs according to its nature: negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Regarding ﬁscal variables, a more detailed explanation is needed. Public
consumption always presents a negative coeﬃcient, along the lines of Barro’s,
1991 results. These estimates have been obtained using labour cost in pub-
lic sector as proxy of public consumption. But the results hold when the
9other proxy variable is considered, i. e. share of public services production
in a territory over the total regional production 5. However, the value and
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of public consumption is sensitive to
the chosen speciﬁcation, as was pointed out by Levine and Renelt, 1992. In
the case of public investment, these changes according to speciﬁcation are
dramatically evident. The sign of this variable turns out to be positive in
columns (2) and (3) whereas it is negative in the ﬁrst column.This circum-
stance could be caused by the high correlations we can ﬁnd among several
variables involved in the regressions and the likely existence of endogeneity
among regressors.
Our estimates of the coeﬃcient of taxes are problematical. They appear
with an implausible positive sign in column (1). In fact, we ﬁnd correlations
in a range of 0.8-0.9 between taxes and variables such as initial income per
capita, public investment and public consumption. So we have decided to
remove taxes as can be seen in columns (2) and (3). Thus in order to control
for the government redistributive function, speciﬁcations in columns (2) and
(3) use the variable sit.
The new variable sit presents a negative sign, which indicates that the
joint eﬀect of taxes and public beneﬁts is growth-reducing. In the case of the
taxes, there is a wide literature about their negative inﬂuence (Barro, 1990;
King and Rebelo, 1990). Something similar happens in the case of public
beneﬁts: many government programs entail negative eﬀects upon save and
work incentives, and as a result of this, growth is aﬀected negatively (Fölster
and Henrekson, 1999). This circumstance is specially true at a regional level,
where the factor mobility leads to eﬃciency gains through the location of
production factors in the most productive areas. At this point, mechanisms
of income maintenance entail a disincentive for the mobility of the labour
10factor.
In turn, column (3) in table 2 shows a set of regressors where public
deﬁcit/surplus is considered. Given this speciﬁcation, unemployment rate is
redundant to control for business cycle so it has been removed. A positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is found for this new variable what means that
budget surplus is growth-enhancing. The explanation of this fact is clear.
Since the size of government is fairly large in modern economies, the public
sector’s decisions on savings are relevant for economic performance. A bor-
rowing government implies lesser resources for private capital accumulation,
so economic growth is negatively aﬀected.
Although no great changes are perceived in the rest of coeﬃcients of the
speciﬁcation (3), various comments can be drawn. Firstly, the inclusion of
public surplus allows obtaining a bigger coeﬃcient for public investment.
This is a clear evidence that the former estimates of this coeﬃcient were
biased since budget deﬁcit was not considered explicitly. Before including
public deﬁcit, the estimate of public investment took the negative eﬀect
of budget deﬁcit as an implicit ﬁnancing element. It happens the same
for public consumption. When budget surplus/deﬁcit is considered, the
coeﬃcient of this variable is slightly lower (in absolute terms) than in column
(2).
Secondly, speciﬁcation (3) proves that private investment reduces its
c o n t r i b u t i o nt og r o w t hr a t e . T h i scan be seen as a consequence of the
crowding-out eﬀect that links government savings to private investment.
Without considering budget surplus/deﬁcit, the coeﬃcient of private invest-
ment is bigger than otherwise. This could mean that private investment
is a usual way through which public deﬁcit can aﬀect growth rate. Other
explanation of the small value achieved by the private investment may come
11from the endogeneity of public and private investment, what would lead to
a misspeciﬁcation of the model so the results would not be consistent.
4A l t e r n a t i v e s p e c i ﬁcations of the growth equa-
tion
Former estimates allow us to state two partial conclusions. The ﬁrst one
refers to the relevance of studying taxes and public spending simultaneously
in growth regressions. The second one is that our estimates are consistent
with economic theory for the most variables included as regressors. However,
a further research is required to be sure about the non-signiﬁcant value
reached by the public investment and the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of
private investment. Moreover, some references have stressed the risks of
endogeneity when public capital is included in this kind of estimates (see, for
example, Sturm, 1998). Similarly, the literature about economic growth has
s h o w nt h a tt h ep r i v a t ei n v e s t m e n tr a t em a yd e p e n do ni n c o m eg r o w t hr a t e
(King and Levine, 1994). Hence, the likely endogeneity of some regressors
m i g h tr e s u l ti ni n c o n s i s t e n te s t i m a t i o n s .
This possibility is dealt with in this section. We have used two instru-
mental variables methods. The ﬁr s to p t i o nw eh a v ef o l l o w e di st h eo n e
proposed by Fölster and Henrekson, 2001. They estimate a growth equa-
tion in ﬁrst diﬀerences by using a two-stage least squared (TSLS) estimator.
The results we obtain employing this strategy can be seen in table 3; the
i n s t r u m e n t ss e t su s e di ne a c hs p e c i ﬁcation are displayed in the appendix6.
To assume the lack of serial correlation in the disturbances is essential
for the consistency of estimators. In order to test this hypothesis, we adopt
the strategy suggested by Arellano and Bond, 1991: if the errors are not
12correlated, the series of diﬀerentiated residuals should present a signiﬁcant
ﬁrst-order correlation, while indications of second-order serial correlation
ought not to be present. Fortunately, two statistics m1 and m2 show evi-
dence of no serially correlated errors.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
As the values of coeﬃcients in table 3 have been computed when growth
regression is run in ﬁrst diﬀerences, so they must be interpreted accord-
ingly. First of all, one should notice that the estimated signs are the same
as before. The coeﬃcient of public consumption becomes signiﬁcant when
the lag of this variable is not included among the instruments set (column
(3)); it suggests that endogeneity does not seem to be a problem for public
consumption. The value obtained for public investment is now statistically
signiﬁcant and higher than private investment. This fact remains when the
likely endogeneity of private investment is regarded (columns (2) and (3) of
table 3). In spite of recognising that an underprovision of infrastructures
might be one of the causes for this phenomenon, it is diﬃcult to explain why
ac o e ﬃcient for public investment is three times bigger than one for private
investment.
A second method to control for endogeneity is to use a GMM procedure.
Since the nature of this estimation method is minimizing the correlations
between regressors and residuals, its utilization will allow us to generate
an eﬃcient instruments set. The potential heteroskedasticity in the distur-
bances suggests a two-step GMM procedure. Nevertheless, diﬀerent Mon-
tecarlo simulations show that the standard errors estimated in a two-step
procedure may be biased, so it is advisable to take one-step GMM esti-
mators in the case of the inference based on asymptotic standard errors7.
13Unlike the previous IV estimator, where ﬁrst diﬀerences were considered, we
come back to the within-groups estimator. Thus using lagged regressors as
possible instruments is not the best option. We will employ, therefore, the
transformation of variables in orthogonal deviations (Arellano, 1988).
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The results of this methodology are shown in table 4. Diﬀerent instru-
ments sets have been considered, as can be seen in the appendix. The ﬁto f
the regressions is better than in the case of the TSLS estimator. The statis-
tics m1 and m2 shows no evidence of serially correlated errors. A Sargan
test has been performed to check the validity of the instruments sets; though
the values are not reported here, the results of the tests have rejected the
diﬀerent groups of instruments. However, Arellano and Bond, 1991 demon-
strate the trend to over-reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. Notice that we have chosen the option of
estimating via one-step GMM. In turn, a remarkable sensitivity of the re-
sults is not appreciated as far as the choice of the matrix of instruments is
concerned.
Once again no relevant changes are found. A more stable value for the
catching-up eﬀect is obtained, involving a speed of convergence around 8
per cent. The coeﬃcient of private investment is now close to those re-
ported in other papers. Public investment appears to have a positive eﬀect
on growth, although its statistical signiﬁcance is far from the conventional
threshold. Something similar occurs for the redistributive function of the
government -measured by the variable sit-, with a negative sign. Public con-
sumption becomes now signiﬁcant, showing a negative impact on regional
growth whereas budget surplus maintains its positive eﬀect upon the growth
rate of income per capita of the Spanish regions.
145C o n c l u s i o n s
T h ed e b a t ea b o u tt h ee ﬀects of ﬁscal policy on growth rate has a long
tradition in growth economics. A high number of papers provide evidence
about the inﬂuence of the government’s size and the composition of public
spending and taxes on the growth rate of the countries. Moreover, recent
empirical studies have stressed the relevance of taking into account both
sides of public performance; otherwise, the risk of achieving biased estimates
for a growth equation is presented and the conclusions might be misleading.
This paper show evidence about the impact of diﬀerent ﬁscal variables
on regional economic growth. We have obtained estimates from running a
growth regression for the Spanish regions over the period 1965-1997. In spite
of several diﬃculties related to the variables used and to the availability of
regional data, our results are consistent with various theoretical frameworks
and show that it is important to consider public spending and revenues
simultaneously in growth regressions.
The main results are the following. A catching-out eﬀect is found and
the coeﬃcients of private investment and population growth are those to be
expected. Public consumption, taxes and social beneﬁts aﬀect growth rate
negatively, whereas budget surplus and public investment exert a positive
eﬀect. The eﬀect of public deﬁcit might ﬂow through private investment.
I no r d e rt oa v o i dam i s - s p e c i ﬁcation problem, we have checked our results
by including diﬀerent sets of control variables and using two instrumental
variables estimators.
These ﬁndings suggest several policy implications. According to the
estimates, the composition of public expenditure is relevant for the regional
growth processes. Since public capital appears as a weighty production
factor, public resources devoted to this aim will promote economic growth.
15Thus, current regional policies based on public investment have academic
arguments to be implemented. However, this fact should not lead to defend
automatically a signiﬁcant increase of infrastructures programs because it is
clear that public intervention implies a welfare cost as a result of the taxes
needed to ﬁnance it.
On the other hand, policy-makers must be aware that redistribution
policies have an eﬃciency cost. Taxes, social beneﬁts programs and a part
of public consumption linked to them satisfy equity principles but they may
also introduce disincentives in job and savings decisions. From a regional
point of view, social beneﬁts play an important role in work force mobility,
so an adequate design of them is really worthy. This might be interpreted
as a regional version of the dilemma between eﬃciency and equity in terms
of economic growth.
AA p p e n d i x
This appendix collects the deﬁnition of instruments sets we have used in sec-
tion 4. Table 3 includes estimates in ﬁrst diﬀerences of the growth equation,
and the instruments used are:
• Column (1): lagged levels of public investment, public consumption,
redistributive function of government, public surplus/deﬁcit; ﬁxed coun-
try eﬀects; levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the population growth; ﬁrst
diﬀerences of private investment; and levels of initial income per capita
lagged two periods (two lags are required here in order to deal with
our dynamic panel data correctly).
• Column (2): lagged levels of public investment, public consumption,
redistributive function of government, public surplus/deﬁcit and pri-
16vate investment; ﬁxed country eﬀects; levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
population growth; and levels of initial income per capita lagged two
periods (two lags are required here in order to deal with our dynamic
panel data correctly).
• Column (3): lagged levels of public investment, redistributive function
of government, public surplus/deﬁcit and private investment; ﬁxed
country eﬀects; levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the population growth;
levels of public consumption; and levels of initial income per capita
lagged two periods (two lags are required here in order to deal with
our dynamic panel data correctly).
Table 4 includes GMM estimates of the growth equation, and the instru-
ments used are:
• Column (1): Levels of public investment, public consumption, redis-
tributive function of government and public surplus/deﬁcit with one
lag.
• Column (2): Levels of public consumption, redistributive function of
government and public surplus/deﬁcit with one lag; and levels of public
investment with one and two lags.
• Column (3): Levels of public consumption and public surplus/deﬁcit
with one lag; and levels of public investment and redistributive func-
tion of government with one and two lags.
• Column (4): Levels of public investment, public consumption, redis-
tributive function of government and public surplus/deﬁcit and private
investment with one lag.
17Notes 1Three observations with values very close to zero have been removed in order to avoid
distortions in estimates.
2No reasonable signs were obtained for the log of initial income per capita in these ﬁrst
estimates, so this variable has been removed. Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 note that the
signiﬁcance of several variables in growth regressions is sensitive to the inclusion or not of
the initial income per capita. In order to avoid mis-speciﬁcation, ﬁxed eﬀects have been
included to control for diﬀerences among regions at the starting point; the values of these
ﬁxed eﬀects seem to be a good proxy of initial income per capita (the results are available
upon request).
3This time trend is correlated with the income per capita. We have decided not to
omit it because its absence aﬀects considerably the coeﬃcient of ﬁscal variables, specially
public investment. These estimates are available upon request.
4Human capital was measured through the share of working-age population with sec-
ondary and university studies. Several papers have concluded that the eﬀects of human
capital on growth are very diﬃcult to grasp (see, for instance, De la Fuente, 2002; Wolf;
2000; Kneller et al., 1999). Anyway, the results of estimates with human capital are
available upon request.
5These estimates are not reported here but they are available upon request
6Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the instruments set have been considered for running these
regressions but all of them reinforce the result presented here; anyway, they are available
upon request.
7For a further discussion, see Arellano and Bond, 1991. Also Judson and Owen, 1999
justify one-step GMM estimator from another point of view: the smaller bias generated
in non-balanced panels with a time dimension close to 20.
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23Table 1: Growth regression for Spanish regions (without initial income per
capita), 1965-1997. Dependent variable: growth rate of income per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Populationgrowth -0.510a(0.138) -0.443a(0.145) -0.579a(0.145)
Private investment 0.125a (0.045) 0.184a (0.049) 0.127a (0.044)
Taxes -0.108a (0.024) -0.148a (0.031)
Public investment -0.204 (0.133) 0.290c (0.173)
RSS 0.136 0.143 0.135
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: FBBVA and IVIE
a,b,c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
24Table 2: Growth regression with ﬁscal variables for Spanish regions, 1965-
1997. Dependent variable: growth rate of income per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Log(yi0) -0.121a (0.016) -0.163a (0.015) -0.144a (0.015)
nit -0.309a (0.120) -0.306b (0.133) -0.377a (0.124)
spit 0.200a (0.036) 0.188a (0.041) 0.127a (0.041)
sgit -0.160 (0.127) 0.073 (0.135) 0.175 (0.129)
cgit -0.258 (0.176) -0.710a (0.165) -0.609a (0.155)
psit -0.474a (0.071)
τit 0.445a (0.073)
sit -0.176a (0.073) -0.112 (0.074)
dt 0.004a (0.0006)
RSS 0.076 0.087 0.079
Hausman 192.20 33.01 180.58
F-test 2.59 5.18 4.30
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: FBBVA and IVIE
a,b,c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
25Table 3: Growth regression with ﬁscal variables for Spanish regions, 1965-
1997. IV-TSLS Dependent variable: growth rate of income per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Log(yi0) -0.213a (0.034) 0.212a (0.034) -0.123b (0.064)
nit -0.540a (0.128) -0.540a (0.129) -0.749a (0.129)
spit 0.175a (0.036) 0.185a (0.056) 0.187a (0.062)
sgit 1.058a (0.243) 1.060a (0.236) 0.923a (0.190)
cgit -0.452 (0.351) -0.454 (0.352) -0.705a (0.258)
sit -0.568a (0.157) -0.558a (0.154) -0.441a (0.156)
dt 0.004a (0.001) 0.004a (0.001) 0.007a (0.002)
RSS 0.102 0.102 0.118
m1 -2.652 -2.626 -2.411
m2 -1.697 -1.684 -1.179
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: FBBVA and IVIE
a,b,c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
26Table 4: Growth regression with ﬁscal variables for Spanish regions, 1965-
1997. IV-GMM Dependent variable: growth rate of income per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (yi0) -0.172a (0.021) -0.168a (0.021) -0.164a (0.020) -0.160a (0.020)
nit -0.229c (0.122) -0.254b (0.127) -0.255b (0.127) -0.234b (0.115)
spit 0.249a (0.056) 0.225a (0.050) 0.207a (0.048) 0.166a (0.033)
sgit 0.117 (0.146) 0.203c (0.126) 0.180 (0.122) 0.175 (0.131)
cgit -0.578a (0.238) -0.520b (0.227) -0.529a (0.193) -0.576a (0.222)
sit -0.139c (0.083) -0.107 (0.070) -0.109c (0.060) -0.089 (0.085)
dt 0.003a (0.0006) 0.003a (0.0006) 0.003a (0.0005) 0.004a (0.0005)
RSS 0.083 0.081 0.081 0.080
m1 3.266 3.235 3.255 3.037
m2 1.956 1.814 1.838 1.670
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: FBBVA and IVIE
a,b,c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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